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BOOK REVIEW
THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
by Welsh S. White, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1987. Pp.
198. $34.95 hardcover.
Reviewed by Jack Greenberg*
Welsh S. White takes us on a guided tour of the leading doctrines of modern
capital punishment law in The Death Penalty in the Eighties: An Examination
of the Modern System of Capital Punishment.' White's principal starting point
is the 1976 Supreme Court decision, Gregg v. Georgia2. He outlines the reasoning
of Gregg and its companion cases, decisions which substantially restricted the
use of the death penalty, and follows with an analysis of more recent decisions
in which the Court, in parallel with or influenced by public frustration with the
infrequency of executions, has facilitated the execution of death row defendants.
Professor White writes, however, that the period in which we now find ourselves
is not simply one of rush-to-judgment. He says that "it would be an oversim-
plification to suggest that the court is simply adopting a more permissive attitude
toward the use of capital punishment. Rather, its view of capital punishment is
deeply ambivalent. Indeed, decisions decided no more than a year apart often
seem to manifest totally different priorities." 3 The description at all points is
thoroughgoing and accurate.
Death Penalty accurately and concisely describes issues relating to plea
bargaining,4 the penalty trial,5 the defendant's right to present evidence and
arguments at the penalty trial,6 the prosecutor's closing argument at the penalty
trial,7 racial descrimination in the imposition of the death penalty," defendants
who elect execution, 9 and death qualification of jurors or the exclusion of jurors
with scruples against capital punishment.10
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Journal of Legislation
Professor White not only reads the cases, statutes and death penalty statistics,
but he has, refreshingly, interviewed counsel in many death cases in order to
present information that does not appear in the usual legal sources. For example,
in discussing plea bargaining, he tells of Robert and Susan Morrow, lawyers in
Harris County, Texas, who persuaded the prosecutor to dismiss the capital charge
against a defendant charged with the rape, kidnapping, and murder of his niece
in exchange for a plea of guilty to the rape charge. The defendant, however,
refused to go through with the deal because he was ashamed to admit that he
had raped his niece. The prosecutor would not reopen the bargain and so the
defendant went to trial, was convicted, and sentenced to death." Such a quirky
reaction is one of a vast number of irrational responses which frustrate efforts
at even-handed imposition of the death penalty.
In the course of informing his discussion of legal issues with information
gathered from counsel, Professor White occasionally explores issues of profes-
sional responsibility. He tells the story of Bruce Ledewitz, a Duquesne University
law professor, whose "unyielding opposition to any form of killing leads him to
use whatever means he can to dissuade the defendant" from going through with
a decision to acquiesce to being executed. 12 He quotes Professor Ledewitz as
saying, "[Wihen I represent a capital defendant, I'm not there to let him kill
himself."' 3 Professor White adds, "[O]f the attorneys with whom I spoke, not
one indicated that he could imagine a case in which he would voluntarily allow
a capital defendant to submit to execution.' 14
The most interesting part of Death Penalty deals with racial discrimination
in the imposition of the death penalty. This was an issue which the Supreme
Court addressed in McCleskey v. Kemp. 5 At the time of the publication of
Death Penalty, McCleskey had been decided in the court of appeals but not yet
in the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court decision proceeded
on the assumption that the facts asserted by defendant were accurate. Indeed,
the sense of the opinions is that the assertions of fact were indeed correct. These
facts, as measured by the best available scientific techniques, revealed that capital
punishment is administered in a racially discriminatory fashion. The numbers
were marshalled in a considerable variety of combinations. But no matter how
one looked at the numbers, the unavoidable conclusion emerged that blacks who
murder whites are sentenced to death significantly more frequently than defen-
dants involving cases of any other racial combination. The fundamental basis of
the Supreme Court's decision was that no racially discriminatory intent had been
demonstrated in the case of the particular defendant or in the administration of
the system generally. Of course, aberrations of this sort (not solely racial and
perhaps not so egregious) were the basis of the Court's decision in Furman v.
Georgia,'6 and the reason why in that case the death penalty was held unconsti-
tutional.
11. Id. at 37.
12. Id. at 144.
13. Id. at 145.
14. Id.
15. - U.S. - , 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed. 2d 262, 55 U.S.L.W. 4537 (1987), rehearing den.
-_U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3199 (1987).
16. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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The conclusion is inescapable that the Court was principally motivated in
McCleskey by the overwhelming public support for capital punishment and that
to uphold McCleskey's claim would have made it extremely difficult to administer
the death penalty at an acceptable cost. The national reaction to Furman, i.e.,
the reenactment of captial statutes in thirty-five states, taught the Court that it
was dealing with an institution so popular that it should think twice before once
more prohibiting its use. Nevertheless, if the Court was rebuffed by the national
reaction to Furman, it is possible that it also misguaged the repsonse to Mc-
Cleskey. There is a way to find out. Congress could enact legislation implementing
section five of the fourteenth amendment which would prohibit administering
capital punishment in a racially discriminatory way. Legislation was the route by
which Congress in the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,1" overruled the
Supreme Court decision in Bolden v. City of Mobile.18 Bolden held that to
establish a voting rights violation, the plaintiff had to prove an intent to
discriminate. The 1982 Act required only that discriminatory effect be shown.
Congress could do the same with regard to McCleskey. It could find that the
death penalty is administered in a racially discriminatory pattern. Indeed, the
facts in McCleskey demonstrate that this is true. Congress could declare that it
is unlawful to impose or execute sentences of death in a racially disproportionate
pattern and could declare which statistical methods of proof would suffice, what
constitutes a prima facia case and what a state must prove to rebut that case. It
is one thing to support capital punishment. It is quite another to tolerate its
administration in a racially disproportionate way. Congress now, or some day in
the not too distant future, could agree.
Death Penalty, of course, does not deal with the possibility of such legislation.
But the book is a useful guide for those who want to understand the intricacies
of capital punishment law and litigation and the future course of the death
penalty in America. Any objective understanding of how the death penalty works
must support efforts to abolish it.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(b) and (aa).
18. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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